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Abstract. Measurements play a fundamental role in nowadays forensic activities, especially in criminal justice.
Guilt or innocence and the severity of a sentence do often depend upon the results of measurements. On the
other hand, it is well-known that measurement results are always aﬀected by uncertainty, so that any decision
based on measurement results carries an implicit risk of being wrong: uncertainty helps in estimating this risk.
If this concept is translated into the juridical world, it is quite immediate to recognize that uncertainty may
quantify how reasonable is the doubt with which a verdict is rendered by the trier of facts. Unfortunately,
forensic disciplines are still largely unaware of the basic, fundamental concepts of metrology. This paper is
aimed at showing how forensic metrology is developing in diﬀerent countries and reporting a few cases where
metrology played a key role.
1 Introduction
The law reports of the last few decades have consistently
shown that justice, and in particular criminal justice, is
more and more often referring to scientiﬁc evidence to
solve the cases. Scientiﬁc evidence is the result of experi-
mental activity, so that guilt or innocence and the severity
of a sentence do often depend upon the results of mea-
surements. It is common knowledge that sanctions against
speed limit violations are issued on the basis of speed mea-
surements performed by radars or other instruments, that
sanctions (and sentences to imprisonment) for driving un-
der the inﬂuence (DUI) of alcohol or drugs are issued on
the basis of breath or blood tests, and that the perpetrators
of crimes are very often identiﬁed through DNA analysis,
bitemark analysis or hair analysis.
The main reason for this is that science is generally
considered by non scientists, such as the triers of facts
are, as capable of providing a more certain reconstruc-
tion of the facts than the one that could be obtained with
more traditional methods, such as testimonies. On the
other hand, scientists are well aware that science has in-
trinsic limitations, and cannot represent reality with full
certainty. In particular, when scientiﬁc evidence is ob-
tained through measurement results, it is well-known that
these results can never provide the true value of the mea-
surand, but only incomplete information about the mea-
surand itself. Metrology quantiﬁes this lack of complete
information with measurement uncertainty [1, 2].
It can be therefore assumed, as the Guide to the
Expression of Uncertainty in Measurement (GUM) [3]
clearly states, that uncertainty in measurement is a syn-
onym for doubt, that is it means doubt about the validity
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of the result of a measurement. On the other hand, one
of the principles on which all law systems are based is that
any decision rendered by the trier of facts must be rendered
beyond any reasonable doubt. Since one of the pillars on
which metrology is based is the capability of evaluating
and expressing uncertainty, a measurement result, if cor-
rectly expressed together with its associated uncertainty,
provides also an evaluation of the inherent doubt about its
validity. Consequently, when the trier of facts bases his
or her decision on a measurement result, if uncertainty is
provided, he or she is given an important piece of infor-
mation to consider whether the remaining doubt about the
correctness of the decision is reasonable or not.
Scientiﬁc evidence has gained such an importance in
the courts of justice, that the validity of the forensic sci-
ence methods, as applied in tribunals, has been widely
discussed in the USA, where a recent document has been
published by the President’s Council of Advisors on Sci-
ence and Technology (PCAST) [4]. Yet, this important
document neglects the importance of metrology in assess-
ing the validity of these methods, and neglects the recent
application ﬁeld of metrology, forensic metrology [5–8],
that is more and more referred to by all ﬁgures working in
the forensic ﬁeld.
This paper is aimed at proposing a short survey on how
forensic metrology developed and how it can provide good
answers to the questions raised by the PCAST report. At
last, a few examples of cases where scientiﬁc evidence
played a key role and have been solved thanks to metrol-
ogy will be reported.
2 The evolution of forensic metrology
Forensic disciplines have been, and still are, largely un-
aware of the basic, fundamental concepts of metrology.
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Law people (judges, prosecutors and lawyers) tend to
trust science and the results of scientiﬁc tests (such as
DNA analysis) as ultimate and conclusive evidence and
do believe that verdicts based on such results are al-
ways rendered “beyond any reasonable doubt”. This was
the ﬁrm common belief in the late 70s of the 20th cen-
tury, when the International Association for Identiﬁcation
(I.A.I.) adopted a resolution, as reported in [9], where
providing courtroom testimony describing an identiﬁca-
tion through latent prints as “possible, probable or likely”,
rather than “certain”, was considered a professional mis-
conduct for its members.
This conviction that experts called to testify in a trial
must provide certainty to the trier of facts remained deep-
rooted for a long period of time, at least until judge Black-
mun of the US Supreme Court, in the famous Daubert
case, stated, in 1993, that “[I]t would be unreasonable to
conclude that the subject of scientiﬁc testimony must be
‘known’ to a certainty; arguably there are no certainties
in science” [9].
As a consequence of this sentence, also the US lower
courts began to consider the experts who testiﬁed taking
into account uncertainty, or a safety margin, more reliable
than those who did not. According to this new trend, some
US lawyers started to openly refer to measurement uncer-
tainty whenever measurement results were considered as
pieces of evidence [10]. It is not surprising that the cases
where uncertainty has ﬁrst become an important additional
piece of evidence were those related to driving under the
inﬂuence (DUI) of alcohol or drugs, since the amount of
alcohol or drug in the driver’s blood is measured by ded-
icated instruments, whose uncertainty should be prelimi-
narily evaluated and considered in assessing whether the
alcohol or drug content has exceeded the tolerated limit
[11].
Such cases represent a typical example of how, absent
an uncertainty value, the measured values may lead to an
incorrect decision. Let us suppose, for instance, that a
value xm is measured for a quantity x on a given scale,
as shown in Fig. 1, where uncertainty is not given.
Figure 1. Example of measured value with no uncertainty de-
clared. t: threshold value
If quantity x is prescribed not to exceed a thresh-
old value t, such situation is apparently showing that the
threshold value has been exceeded with full certainty, so
that the trier of fact will quite likely render a verdict of
guilt beyond any reasonable doubt.
However, once the standard uncertainty is evaluated
and expressed, it is possible, according to the GUM [3]
recommendation, to build an interval, about the measured
value, into which the measurand value is supposed to lie
with a given coverage probability, that depends on the as-
sumed coverage factor and probability distribution. Fig. 2
shows the same situation as that of Fig. 1, where uncer-
tainty is declared, and a normal probability distribution is
assumed for the distribution of values that could be rea-
sonably attributed to the measurand x.
Figure 2. Example of measured value where uncertainty is de-
clared. t: threshold value. Yellow area: probability that the value
of the measurand falls below the threshold
It can be immediately recognized that a probability
exists that the measurand value is lower than the given
threshold, and this probability is given by:
P {x ≤ t} =
∫ t
−∞
p(x)dx (1)
where p(x) is the considered probability density function.
This probability is graphically represented, in Fig. 2, by
the yellow-shaded area under p(x).
It can be readily perceived that, the closer is the mea-
sured value to the threshold and the higher is uncertainty,
the higher is the probability that the measurand is be-
low the threshold even if the measured value is above the
threshold. In other words, the trier of facts might not be
able to render a decision beyond any reasonable doubt,
and uncertainty, if properly evaluated and used, can help
him or her in quantifying this doubt. It is evident that not
providing uncertainty is the same as hiding an important
piece of evidence to the trier of facts.
3 Forensic metrology and the PCAST
report
As stated in the last section, the methods of the forensic
metrology have been initially adopted by lawyers, par-
    
18th I nternational Congress of Metrology, 10004 (2017)
2
  DOI: 10.1051/ 7metrology/201  10004
ticularly in ﬁelds where the triers of facts base their de-
cisions directly on measurement results (such as in DUI
cases), and have been positively considered mainly by the
courts of common law countries, where the adopted law
system empowers judges with more discretionary power
than other law systems.
More recently, a debate has started in the US, about
the validity of the forensic science methods adopted in the
courts of justice. The already mentioned PCAST report
[4] is the most recent and pondered answer to the ques-
tions raised. Nevertheless, this report does not yet con-
sider metrology in an explicit way, and this is, probably,
its major weak point.
Indeed, this report was originated by a 2009 report on
forensic science, issued by the National Research Coun-
cil [12], which was quite critical on the real validity of
the employed methods and caused a sensation. In the
attempt to answer to the critical comments moved by
this report, the PCAST report considers the most used
feature-comparison methods and considers general rules
to establish the scientiﬁc validity of DNA analysis, latent
ﬁngerprint analysis, bitemark analysis, ﬁrearm analysis,
footwear analysis and hair analysis.
In particular, scientiﬁc validity is deﬁned considering
two diﬀerent aspects: foundational validity and validity as
applied. The following deﬁnitions are given.
• Foundational validity for a forensic-science method re-
quires that it be shown, based on empirical studies, to
be repeatable, reproducible, and accurate, at levels that
have been measured and are appropriate to the intended
application. Foundational validity, then, means that a
method can, in principle, be reliable.
• Validity as applied means that the method has been reli-
ably applied in practice.
Despite the extensive discussion on how the validity
of the considered feature-comparison methods can be as-
sessed in terms of the two above deﬁnitions, the report fails
to provide a quantitative evaluation on how valid these
methods are. However, this would have been relatively
easy if also uncertainty were considered, together with the
already mentioned concepts of repeatability, reproducibil-
ity and accuracy.
Indeed, both given deﬁnitions of foundational validity
and validity as applied can be interpreted in terms of uncer-
tainty contributions. Let us consider, ﬁrst, the deﬁnition of
deﬁnitional uncertainty given by the International Vocab-
ulary of Metrology (VIM) [13]: component of measure-
ment uncertainty resulting from the ﬁnite amount of de-
tail in the deﬁnition of a measurand. Considering that this
component of measurement uncertainty represents also the
practical minimum measurement uncertainty achievable
in any measurement of a given measurand, since it de-
pends on the limited knowledge about the measurand, it
does quantify also how a method can, in principle, be reli-
able. Therefore, the deﬁnitional uncertainty can be seen as
the metrological counterpart of the deﬁnitional validity de-
ﬁned by the PCAST report, with the additional advantage
that methods are available to quantify it.
Let us now consider the deﬁnition of instrumental un-
certainty given by the VIM [13]: component of measure-
ment uncertainty arising from a measuring instrument or
measuring system in use. It is evident that this uncer-
tainty contribution is the most relevant one in assessing
whether a method can be reliably applied in practice and
is, therefore, the metrological counterpart of the validity
as applied. Strictly speaking, the validity as applied can
be quantiﬁed by the combination of the deﬁnitional and
instrumental uncertainty contributions.
To better qualify these concepts, let us brieﬂy consider
the validity of the DNA analysis used in DNA proﬁling,
that represents, nowadays, one of the most relevant pieces
of evidence in crime solution. Validity of DNA proﬁling is
generally discussed only in terms of wrong match proba-
bility, that is the probability that two individuals share the
same DNA components used to proﬁle a single individual.
It has been proven [14] that the wrong match probability
represents only the deﬁnitional uncertainty, and that this
contribution might be order of magnitude lower than all
other uncertainty contributions that might be originated in
the references used in the analysis, as well as in the pos-
sible sample contamination, ampliﬁed by the DNA ampli-
ﬁcation methods employed when the available material is
not enough to run the test [14, 15].
It is then possible to conclude that metrology can pro-
vide a solid contribution toward a quantitative evaluation
of the validity of forensic science methods and the pro-
vided results. Consequently, it helps the trier of facts to
estimate the remaining doubt on the validity of a decision
rendered on the basis of these results, as the cases reported
in the following section show.
4 Case studies
The following three cases, two based on DNA proﬁling
and one on breath alcohol tests, show, in a quite signiﬁcant
way, the problems that neglecting uncertainty may cause.
4.1 The case of the bartender in Liverpool
In Litherland, a small village north of Liverpool, UK, a
bartender was quietly attending at his duties when, on a
day of February 2003, the police collared him under in-
dictment for murdering a 24 year-old Italian girl during a
robbery attempt in Castiglioncello, a small village on the
Tuscany coast, not far from Florence, Italy, on the pre-
vious August. The DNA found in the abundant trail of
blood left on the crime scene by the mugger, after the vic-
tim’s boyfriend hit his face with a stone, in the attempt to
protect the victim, was found compatible with that of the
bartender with full certainty, and the poor bartender was
considered guilty beyond any reasonable doubt [16].
The bartender protested his innocence, stating that he
never went to Italy, but nobody believed him, since the
DNA was considered conclusive and undeniable evidence.
Luckily for the bartender, the regular customers of the pub
where he worked gave evidence that they saw him at work
on the day the murder was committed. Even more luckily,
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on that same day, the pub’s owner was at the funeral cere-
mony of a relative. The pub was open, the bartender was
the only employee, so he was the person behind the bar,
on that day, without any possible doubt. In the end, he was
cleared from the charge, despite the DNA analysis.
This is one of the best-known examples that scientiﬁc
tests may provide incorrect results. In this case, measure-
ment uncertainty was not considered, and nobody consid-
ered whether the performed test had scientiﬁc validity or
not. However, after this case, the foundational validity of
the DNA proﬁling tests was reconsidered, and the number
of DNA alleles considered by UK labs was increased from
9 to 13, and uniformed to the number used in the USA to
proﬁle individuals.
A more careful consideration of both the deﬁnitional
and instrumental uncertainty contributions would have
saved the bartender from a big fear and, most importantly,
could have avoided a big miscarriage of justice that only
the presence of so many undeniable witnesses avoided.
4.2 The Perugia case
This case had a large resonance on the crime news in Italy,
UK and US, due to the nationality of the involved peo-
ple [7]. A young British student, Meredith, attending the
University in Perugia, Italy, was was killed, in 2007, with
several stab wounds inﬂicted by a kitchen knife. The ini-
tial investigation led to the discovery of such a knife in the
house of two school mates of Meredith, Raﬀaele, an Ital-
ian student, and Amanda, his American girl-friend. The
coroners who examined the victim assessed that this knife
was compatible with her wounds, so it could have been the
murder weapon.
A DNA analysis was ordered and the report ﬁled by the
expert who was asked to perform the analysis stated that
Raﬀaele’s and Amanda’s DNA were present on the knife
handle (which was not surprising at all, since this was their
kitchen knife), and that Meredith’s DNA was present on
the blade. The report stated also that the quantity of bio-
logical material present on the knife blade was quite small
and insuﬃcient to repeat the test. The important point,
here, is that uncertainty was estimated, but was reported
without the necessary emphasis, so that it was not consid-
ered during the trial.
As a consequence of this test and the way it was re-
ported to the trier of facts, the presence of Meredith’s
DNA on the blade of Amanda’s and Raﬀaele’s knife was
considered conclusive evidence that Amanda and Raﬀaele
killed Meredith, and they were convicted of murder and
sentenced to twenty-six years imprisonment.
The defense appealed against this verdict, and a second
trial started in front of a diﬀerent judge. According to the
Italian law system, the judge of the second trial can order
the repetition of the experimental tests considered during
the ﬁrst trial or, if this is not possible, a new analysis of the
results can be requested.
Since the repetition of the DNA analysis was not pos-
sible, the judge asked a team of experts to re-analyze the
report ﬁled by the expert who performed the DNA analysis
and provide their opinion on the results. This team consid-
ered the estimation of measurement uncertainty done by
the expert who performed the DNA analysis and discussed
it and the diﬀerent contributions to uncertainty in deep de-
tails. The conclusion was that the values measured during
the test were below the uncertainty value, and therefore,
it was not possible to state whether the DNA on the blade
was that of Meredith beyond the reasonable doubt quan-
tiﬁed by measurement uncertainty. Surprisingly enough,
this conclusion was already present, though not clearly ex-
posed, in the original report, but was totally ignored by the
trier of facts of the ﬁrst trial.
The judge accepted the fact that the DNA test could not
be considered conclusive evidence and returned a verdict
of not guilt for Amanda and Raﬀaele, who were released
after four years of imprisonment. Unfortunately, this was
not the end of the story, because three more proceedings
were celebrated before a ﬁnal verdict of not guilt was re-
turned.
For the sake of brevity, we do not consider, here, the
judicial details of these proceedings, since, in the end, they
conﬁrmed the verdict of the ﬁrst appeal trial. On the other
hand, it is worth noting that the absence of a clear indica-
tion about measurement uncertainty led the trier of facts to
assign the DNA test the importance of fully certain con-
clusive evidence, thus rendering a verdict beyond any rea-
sonable doubt, whilst the doubt existed and was way more
than reasonable, as recognized by the judge of the appeal
trial and those of the Italian Supreme Court (Corte di Cas-
sazione) who, ﬁnally, accepted those conclusions and ren-
dered a verdict of not guilt.
In other words, measurement uncertainty, in this case,
represented a major and important piece of evidence, and
having neglected it led to an unfair verdict toward the two
defendants.
4.3 The case of the alcohol test
As aforementioned, the DUI cases represented the ﬁrst
cases of successful application of forensic metrology in
the USA [10, 11, 17]. This is no exception also in Eu-
rope. In the past, the punishment was reduced, or not at
all inﬂicted, only when tests could prove that the instru-
ment used to perform a breath alcohol test was not work-
ing properly. A recent Italian verdict, however, reduced a
DUI charge on the basis of mere metrological considera-
tions about uncertainty associated with the measurement
result [18].
A driver was stopped and a breath alcohol concentra-
tion (BAC) test was run. The resulting BAC was 1.51 g/l
of equivalent blood alcohol concentration. The Italian law
considers imprisonment up to 12 months, conﬁscation of
the driving license up to 2 years, conﬁscation of the vehi-
cle and a ﬁne up to 6, 000 e if the alcohol concentration
in blood exceeds 1.5 g/l.
The defense proved that, according to the laws in force
and absent any valid calibration of the instrument used for
the BAC test, the manufacturer speciﬁcation could be used
to evaluate how good the measured alcohol concentration
was.
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The expert witness called by the defense proved that,
according to the manufacturer speciﬁcations, the instru-
ment might drift for up to ±0.02 g/l per month after cal-
ibration. Moreover, the manufacturer declared a standard
uncertainty of 0.023 g/l for the considered range. It was
easy to prove that one month after calibration (whose date
was unknown), the instrument might have measured an al-
cohol concentration value above the 1.5 g/l threshold even
with a concentration value of 1.49 g/l, below the 1.5 g/l
threshold.
Moreover, assuming a normal probability distribution
for the values that can be reasonably attributed to the mea-
surand, the uncertainty value provided by the manufac-
turer returns a probability of 32.5% that the value of the
measurand is below the 1.5 g/l threshold for a measured
value of 1.51 g/l.
The trier of facts accepted the defense reasoning, sup-
ported by the related uncertainty evaluation, and reduced
the charge as if the measured blood alcohol concentration
was in the range immediately below 1.50 g/l, thus prov-
ing that, when uncertainty is correctly evaluated and ex-
plained, its importance is correctly understood by the triers
of facts.
5 Conclusions
Forensic metrology is a new ﬁeld of application of metrol-
ogy and is gaining importance as scientiﬁc evidence is be-
coming more and more relevant in establishing facts to
identify the perpetrators of a crime or misconduct.
People working in the administration of justice are
slowly becoming aware that science cannot always pro-
vide a fully certain interpretation of the facts, especially
when this interpretation is based on measurement results.
On the other hand, as proved by the PCAST report, evalu-
ating how “reliable” a forensic science method is, in order
to quantify the risk of unfair decision, is not an easy task.
In this respect, metrology is a very helpful tool, since,
through the evaluation of the deﬁnitional and instrumental
uncertainty contributions, it is capable of quantifying the
foundational validity and the validity as applied of foren-
sic science methods.
Therefore, it can be concluded that measurement un-
certainty is an important piece of evidence and does al-
ways play in favor of good and fair decisions and, there-
fore, it favors the certainty of law. On the other hand, dis-
regarding uncertainty can be seen as if an important piece
of evidence is kept hidden to, or not at all considered by
the trier of facts. This opens important ethical, and not
only technical or juridical issues.
References
[1] A. Ferrero, Instrumentation Measurement Magazine,
IEEE 18, 7 (2015)
[2] A. Ferrero, S. Salicone, Instrumentation Measure-
ment Magazine, IEEE 9, 44 (2006)
[3] JCGM 100:2008, Evaluation of Measurement
Data – Guide to the Expression of Uncer-
tainty in Measurement, (GUM 1995 with mi-
nor corrections), Joint Committee for Guides
in Metrology (2008), http://www.bipm.org/en/
publications/guides/gum.html
[4] President’s Council of Advisors on Science
and Technology (PCAST), Forensic Science in
Criminal Courts: Ensuring Scientiﬁc Validity of
Feature–Comparison Methods (2016), https:
//obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/
default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/
pcast_forensic_science_report_final.pdf
[5] T. Vosk, in Encyclopedia of forensic sciences,
edited by J.A. Siegel, P.J. Saukko (Academic Press,
Waltham, MA, USA, 2013), Vol. 3, pp. 322–331,
ISBN 9780123821652
[6] T. Vosk, A.F. Emery, E. Fitzgerald, Forensic Metrol-
ogy: A Primer on Scientiﬁc Measurement for
Lawyers, Judges, and Forensic Scientists (Taylor
& Francis, New York, NY, USA, 2014), ISBN
9781439826195
[7] A. Ferrero, V. Scotti, Instrumentation Measurement
Magazine, IEEE 16, 14 (2013)
[8] V. Scotti, Forensic Metrology: Where Law Meets
Measurements, in 20th IMEKO TC4 Symposium
Measurements of Electrical Quantities (2014), pp.
385–389, ISBN 9781634394253
[9] E.J. Imwinkelried, UC Davis Legal Studies Research
Paper No. 317 pp. 1–33 (2012)
[10] T. Vosk, Journal of Physics: Conference Series 772,
1 (2016)
[11] T. Vosk, The champion pp. 48–56 (2010)
[12] N.R.C. Committee on Identifying the Needs of
the Forensic Sciences Community, Strengthening
Forensic Science in the United States: A Path
Forward (2009), http://www.nap.edu/catalog/
12589.html
[13] JCGM 200:2012, International Vocabulary of
Metrology – Basic and General Concepts and As-
sociated Terms (VIM 2008 with minor corrections),
Joint Committee for Guides in Metrology (2012),
http://www.bipm.org/en/publications/
guides/vim.html
[14] A. Ferrero, Instrumentation Measurement Magazine,
IEEE 20, 4 (2017)
[15] C.M. Cale, M.E. Earll, K.E. Latham, G.L. Bush,
Journal of Forensic Sciences 61, 196 (2016)
[16] A. Ferrero, V. Scotti, Instrumentation Measurement
Magazine, IEEE 18, 18 (2015)
[17] T. Vosk, E.J. Imwinkelried, Criminal Law Bulletin
53, 532 (2017)
[18] A. Ferrero, V. Scotti, Tutto_Misure (in Italian) 18,
259 (2016)
    
18th I nternational Congress of Metrology, 10004 (2017)
5
  DOI: 10.1051/ 7metrology/201  10004
